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LITIGATION’S ROLE IN THE PATH OF U.S.
FEDERAL CLIMATE CHANGE REGULATION:
IMPLICATIONS OF AEP V. CONNECTICUT
Hari M. Osofsky*
This symposium analyzes the role of litigation in climate change
regulation, with a particular focus on the U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2011
decision in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut (“AEP”).1 This
Essay adds to that conversation by exploring the significance of AEP for
U.S. federal legal approaches to regulating climate change.
The United States has yet to pass comprehensive climate change
legislation, and it looks unlikely to do so in the near future. In fact, the
recent legislative crisis over raising the debt limit is resulting in budget
cuts for the federal agencies that focus on environmental protection and
energy.2 However, despite congressional inaction, the United States has
an emerging federal-level climate change regulatory regime, due in large
part to the Supreme Court’s decisions on climate change.
The Court’s 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA held that the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) has the authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions under the Clean Air Act and that the EPA had
abused its discretion in failing to exercise that authority without
adequate justification.3 Under the Obama administration, the EPA relies
on Massachusetts to regulate emissions from motor vehicles and power
plants in collaboration with other agencies, major corporate emitters, and
leader states.4 In June 2011, the Supreme Court decided another case
Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School; Associate Director of Law,
Geography & Environment, Consortium on Law and Values in Health, Environment & the
Life Sciences; Affiliated Faculty, Geography and Conservation Biology. This piece, though
it has a different focus, is in part an edited version of Hari M. Osofsky, AEP v.
Connecticut’s Implications for the Future of Climate Change Litigation, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE
101 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/osofsky.html. I appreciate the excellent
work of Associate Dean JoEllen Lind in organizing the symposium, and the helpful
editorial assistance of Paul Ghem, Dustin Klein, Katie Patrick, Jonathan Sichtermann, and
Anne Zygadlo of the Valparaiso University Law Review. As always, I thank Josh, Oz, and
Scarlet Gitelson for their love, support, and patience.
1
131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
2
See Elana Schor, Debt Deal Set to Crater Energy, Enviro Spending for Years to Come, N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2011/07/28/28greenwire-debtdeal-set-to-crater-energy-enviro-spending-66673.html?pagewanted=all.
3
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
4
See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 85, 86, and 600 and 49 C.F.R. pt. 531, 533, 536, 537, and 538); see also Remarks on
Fuel Efficiency Standards, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 00377 (May 19, 2009), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009/DCPD-200900377.pdf.
*
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involving climate change and, in the process, reinforced the country’s
current regulatory path. In AEP, the Supreme Court closed the door to
federal common law nuisance actions involving climate change, but did
so in a manner that gives additional protection to the federal regulatory
approach under Massachusetts.5
This Essay begins in Section I with an analysis of the complex
barriers to effective U.S. action on climate change. Then, Section II
explains the role that the Supreme Court decisions in Massachusetts and
AEP play in shaping federal regulatory approaches.
The Essay
concludes in Section III by considering the decisions’ impact in the
broader context of climate change litigation taking place in the lower
courts within the United States and in domestic and international
tribunals around the world. It argues that litigation is serving a
constructive role in assessing regulatory decisions at multiple levels, but
that critical justice problems will remain unless concerned citizens and
climate change victims have adequate mechanisms for addressing
emissions and impacts.
I. COMPLEXITY OF U.S. EFFORTS TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE
Climate change poses a multidimensional regulatory problem
because addressing it involves many levels of government and a wide
range of governmental and nongovernmental actors. This problem
cannot be solved at just one level of government or through one type of
law.6 Moreover, this governance complexity involves: (1) scientific,
technical, and legal uncertainty; (2) simultaneously overlapping and
fragmented legal regimes; (3) difficulties of balancing inclusion and
efficiency; and (4) inequality and resulting injustice.7 A myriad of
simultaneous strategies must be employed to address both mitigation
and adaptation to impacts fairly and effectively.
The United States’ struggles to regulate climate change at a federal
level reflect these complexities. While extremely strong scientific
consensus exists, internationally and in the United States, that
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions cause climate change, greater

See 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
For an in depth analysis of these issues, see Hari M. Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and
Climate Change Implications for the Obama Administration, 62 ALA. L. REV. 237, 267–83 (2011)
[hereinafter Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change]; Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate
Change “International”? Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585, 631–49
(2009) [hereinafter Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?].
7
For an in depth analysis of each of these aspects of governance complexity in the
context of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill, see Hari M. Osofsky, Multidimensional
Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REV 1077 (2011).
5
6
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uncertainty persists (and will continue to do so due to the nature of the
science) about whether particular emissions result in some types of
specific harms like Hurricane Katrina or 2011’s severe snowstorms, heat,
and flooding; other harms, like sea level rise, are more certain.8 These
uncertainties, together with recent scandals over climate change science
and a handful of vocal climate change skeptics reaching the public
through blogging, conservative programming, and politicians, have
resulted in the U.S. public becoming more skeptical of climate change
This public skepticism, especially paired with political
science.9
divisions between the Senate and the House, and between Congress and
the Executive Branch following the 2010 midterm elections, limits the
viability of new climate change legislation. As a result, long-standing
environmental statutes, recent “clean energy” and economic recovery
legislation, and executive orders provide the primary pathways for
Federal
federal efforts to address climate change mitigation.10
adaptation policy is at an even more nascent stage, guided by an
interagency task force created through executive order by President
Obama in October 2009.11
The difficulties of framing legal mechanisms to respond to complex
and evolving science, amid partisan battles, are exacerbated by the
substantive breadth of climate change. Federal environmental, energy,
mining, tax, transportation, and economic recovery legislation and
regulation represent just some of the areas of law that impact U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions and the need to participate in adaptation
planning. Moreover, these regimes function largely separately and are
assigned to different agencies. The Obama administration’s decision to
bring together fuel efficiency and tailpipe emissions standards, for

See Patrick J. Bartlein, Professor, Dep’t of Geography, Univ. of Or., Remarks at
Seminar on Reading the Fourth IPCC Assessment Report 2007 (Oct. 17, 2007) (author’s
notes) (on file with author); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EVALUATING PROGRESS OF THE U.S.
CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM: METHODS AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS 5 (2007),
available at http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309108268. For a discussion of this
scale-uncertainty problem, see Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?, supra note 6, at
597–98 n.43 and accompanying text.
9
See Yale Project on Climate Change Communication & George Mason University
Center for Climate Change Communication, Climate Change in the American Mind:
Americans’
Global
Warming
Beliefs
and
Attitudes
in
May
2011,
http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/ClimateBeliefsMay2011.pdf.
10
See Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change, supra note 6, at 243–58 (providing
a summary of the Obama administration’s efforts on climate change).
11
See Council on Envtl. Quality, Climate Change Adaptation Task Force, WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/adaptation (last visited
Jan. 17, 2011).
8
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example, represents a rare moment of merging regulatory standards
from different legal regimes.12
This simultaneous overlap and fragmentation among the federal
regimes creates difficult questions about who should be included in
interagency collaboration. Both mitigation and adaptation interact with
a wide range of U.S. federal governmental entities. For instance, the
Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force has three cochairing entities—the Council on Environmental Quality, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Office of Science and
Technology Policy—as well as representatives from six additional
agencies on its steering committee, and members from seven entities
within the Executive Office of the President, twelve departments, and
five independent agencies.13 Having a large number of key entities
involved helps to prevent parallel, uncoordinated action, but can make
decision-making more cumbersome. Moreover, these federal-level
collaborations also take place in the broader context of international,
regional, state, and local efforts, but often without meaningful
coordination among them.14
Justice concerns run through all of these governance complexities.
While a primary focus of climate justice is often at a global level, where
the benefits and burdens of climate change are distributed unequally,
these concerns arise at a national level as well. Existing law helps ensure
the profitability of major corporate emitters—such as in the royalty
scheme that supports deepwater drilling—and those emitters in turn
contribute to campaigns and fund lobbyists in Washington.15 Lowincome communities, communities of color, and indigenous peoples
often bear the brunt of those industries’ externalities; they also have less
capacity to adapt to climate change or to compete for the resources that
assist transition to cleaner, cheaper energy. Although the Obama
administration has made a significant commitment to environmental

See Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change, supra note 6.
WHITE HOUSE COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, PROGRESS REPORT OF THE INTERAGENCY
CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION TASK FORCE: RECOMMENDED ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF A
NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION STRATEGY, app. A (Oct. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/Interagency-ClimateChange-Adaptation-Progress-Report.pdf.
14
See Osofsky, Diagonal Federalism and Climate Change, supra note 6.
15
See Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act (DWRRA), 43 U.S.C.
§ 1337(a)(1), (a)(3)(C) (2006); Melanie Mason, Drilling Support, Donations Big for Texas
MORNING
NEWS,
June
3,
2010,
Congressional
Delegation,
DALLAS
http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/state-politics/20100603-Drilling-supportdonations-big-for-7856.ece.
12
13
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justice concerns, vulnerable populations find it harder to navigate the
above-described complexities of climate change law and policy.16
II. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S ROLE IN SHAPING THE FEDERAL
REGULATORY PATH
The U.S. Supreme Court has entered this federal-level regulatory
dialogue through lawsuits attempting to force agency regulation under
federal environmental statutes and to change corporate behavior directly
through federal common law. In the United States, which has struggled
to develop a coherent federal policy, Massachusetts and AEP powerfully
shape U.S. federal-level efforts to regulate climate change due to
Congress’ failure to pass comprehensive climate change legislation,
which could have supplanted both cases. This Section explores the ways
in which AEP builds on Massachusetts to reinforce the current federal
regulatory pathway.
The Supreme Court’s approach to climate change litigation in AEP
flows from its analysis of both threshold and substantive issues in
Massachusetts. The most important jurisprudential issues raised in the
AEP appeal are standing (whether petitioners have the particularized
interest in the case that allows them to bring the action) and the political
question doctrine (whether the case raises a nonjusticiable political
question). A four justice plurality in AEP found standing based on
Massachusetts’ reasoning, while four justices opposed standing.17
Assuming that Justice Sotomayor, who did not participate in AEP
because she had heard the case while sitting on the Second Circuit, either
joins the group supporting standing or abstains from the issue—which
seems far more likely than her joining the group in opposition—AEP
reinforces that the Court will continue to view governmental petitioners

16
For the Obama administration’s latest efforts on environmental justice, see
Memorandum of Understanding on Environmental Justice and Executive Order 12898,
Aug. 4, 2011, http://epa.gov/environmentaljustice/resources/publications/interagency/
ej-mou-2011-08.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2011). For a discussion of potential U.S. approaches
to climate justice, see Maxine Burkett, Just Solutions to Climate Change: A Climate Justice
Proposal for a Domestic Clean Development Mechanism, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 169 (2008); Alice
Kaswan, Greening the Grid and Climate Justice, 9 ENVTL. L. 1143 (2009). For an analysis of
climate justice concerns at a global level and possible remedies, see Maxine Burkett, Climate
Reparations, 10 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 509 (2009); Ruth Gordon, Climate Change and the
Poorest Nations: Further Reflections on Global Inequality, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 1559 (2007).
17
For analysis of these standing issues, see Daniel A. Farber, Standing on Hot Air:
American Electric Power and the Bankruptcy of Standing Doctrine, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 121,
121–22 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/farber.html; Kevin T. Haroff, On
Thin Air: Standing, Climate Change, and the National Environmental Policy Act, 46 VAL. U. L.
REV. 411, 424 (2012).
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as having the particularized interest necessary to make regulatory
challenges and thus continue to influence the path of federal regulation.
However, the plurality’s affirmation of Massachusetts’s approach to
standing, which focuses heavily on the governmental status of some of
the petitioners, does not resolve the question of whether it would find
standing in a suit with only nongovernmental petitioners. This issue is
currently being litigated in challenges to projects that have a large carbon
footprint, such as coal-fired power plants. Some of these cases involve
federal law and, in the months following the AEP decision, lower courts
have split on this issue. The U.S. District Court for the District of New
Mexico found that six citizen environmental groups lacked standing in a
challenge to oil and gas leases based on climate change,18 while the U.S.
District Court for the District of Colorado held that nongovernmental
organization, WildEarth Guardians, had standing to challenge leases that
allow the venting of methane from a coal mine, including on climate
change grounds.19 Although these district courts’ opinions only have
precedential weight within their own districts, they will influence the
ongoing dialogue about whether standing is appropriate in cases
without governmental petitioners, cases that currently serve as one of the
few ways in which citizens can attempt to shape the energy choices of
major corporations.
In contrast to its explicit language on standing, the Supreme Court’s
cursory treatment of the political question doctrine challenges provides
no guidance regarding whether and when such concerns could arise.
The decisions in the lower courts in AEP and in other climate change
federal common law public nuisance cases include extensive discussion
of whether a public nuisance claim would require an initial policy
determination that would be more appropriate for the political branches
to make.20 However, the words “political question” do not appear
explicitly in the Supreme Court’s opinion in AEP. Four justices held
“that no other threshold obstacle bars review,” and the other four
justices, who were opposed to finding standing, did not address
additional prudential issues, which leaves ambiguity about their position
on the political question doctrine.21 This lack of analysis of a threshold
issue at the core of the lower court decisions is curious, but seems
18
Amigos Bravos v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 2011 WL 3924489 (D.N.M. Aug. 3,
2011). For examples of similar cases, see Arnold & Porter LLP, Climate Change Litigation in
the U.S., CLIMATE CASE CHART (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.climatecasechart.com/.
19
WildEarth Guardians v. U.S. Forest Service, Civil Action No. 08-cv-02167-MSK, Oct.
31, 2011.
20
James R. May, AEP v. Connecticut and the Future of the Political Question Doctrine, 121
YALE L.J. ONLINE 127 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/may.html.
21
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2011).
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unlikely to impact the course of federal statutorily-based regulation
significantly. Cases challenging regulatory policy do not involve
political question problems since they are brought through a statutory
regime and administrative law; therefore, this issue will continue to
arise, mostly, in common law challenges not precluded by AEP.
The core of the AEP decision focuses on the relationship between
federal regulatory authority under the Clean Air Act and common law
public nuisance. The Supreme Court held that “the Clean Air Act and
the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law right to
seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power
AEP bases its unanimous displacement decision on
plants.”22
Massachusetts’s finding that carbon dioxide emissions qualify as air
pollution under the Clean Air Act.23 AEP interprets that finding as
establishing Congress’s delegation to the EPA of “whether and how to
regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from power plants; the delegation is
what displaces federal common law.”24
In the process of explaining its displacement holding, the Court in
AEP makes two interrelated points that will shape the path of efforts to
address climate change at the federal level in the United States. First, it
precludes federal common law nuisance actions as a mechanism for
challenging the EPA’s approach to climate change regulation—even if
the EPA declines to regulate—so long as the EPA has regulatory
Second, the Court simultaneously reinforces the
authority.25
appropriateness of regulatory suits challenging the EPA: “If the
plaintiffs in this case are dissatisfied with the outcome of the EPA’s
forthcoming rulemaking, their recourse under federal law is to seek
[c]ourt of [a]ppeals review, and, ultimately, to petition for certiorari in
this Court.”26 This combination suggests that the Court remains open to
climate change litigation’s continuing role in determining the course of
federal regulation, so long as that litigation has a statutory focus.
In addition to reinforcing the appropriateness of litigation over
federal regulatory approaches, AEP puts pressure on Congress to leave
the current regime under the Clean Air Act in place. The opinion
explicitly does not reach whether a federal common law nuisance action
would be allowed if Congress decided that the EPA could no longer
regulate greenhouse gas emissions. The opinion thus limits federal

Id. at 2537.
See Jonathan H. Adler, A Tale of Two Climate Cases, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109 (2011),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/adler.html.
24
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538.
25
Id. at 2539.
26
Id.
22
23
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common law as a “parallel track” for challenging the EPA’s regulatory
decisions, but leaves that track potentially open if Congress passes
legislation that overrides Massachusetts.27
Finally, AEP continues an ongoing conversation about the role of
federal courts in assessing climate change science. Professors Kysar and
Burkett have raised concerns regarding the Court’s increasing skepticism
about the science in AEP, especially as compared to the discussion of
science in Massachusetts.28 This shift parallels the public opinion shift
described above. However, AEP does not simply focus on the substance
of climate science, but also explicitly claims that the EPA is better
situated than courts to assess climate change science. The Court explains
that “[f]ederal judges lack the scientific, economic, and technological
resources an agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order” and
then elaborates on specific mechanisms that agencies have, but courts
lack.29 This discussion reinforces both Justice Scalia’s statement during
the Massachusetts oral argument that he is “not a scientist,”30 and the
Court’s emphasis throughout AEP of the dominance of an agency
rulemaking, rather than a common law, approach to federal action in this
area.
The decision in AEP, then, represents another step in a path that the
Supreme Court began in Massachusetts. In the process of focusing in on
one particular type of action—federal common law public nuisance
claims that include governmental petitioners—the Court presents a
vision of its future role as an arbiter of regulatory disputes, rather than as
a forum for debating climate change science or for directly addressing
harms to the victims of climate change outside of a legislative
framework.
III. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF AEP
These Supreme Court cases represent only a small fraction of the
cases involving climate change in U.S. courts and other tribunals around
the world. Parties have brought cases in state and national courts and
international tribunals under a wide range of legal theories. While most
cases—including Massachusetts—focus on forcing or limiting government
regulation of major emitters, other cases—such as AEP—attempt to
Id. at 2531, 2538.
See Maxine Burkett, Climate Justice and the Elusive Climate Tort, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE
115 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/burkett.html.
29
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2539−40.
30
Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), 2006
WL 3431932, at *12–13; see also Hari M. Osofsky, The Intersection of Scale, Science, and Law in
Massachusetts v. EPA, 9 OR. REV. INT’L L. 233, 234 (2007).
27
28
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change corporate behavior through tort or rights theories. As discussed
in my previous scholarship, these cases impact efforts to regulate climate
change directly by altering the regulatory landscape both in terms of
who can regulate and what regulation they engage in, and also more
indirectly by putting pressure on the government and corporations and
raising public awareness of the problem.31
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in AEP evinces an
understanding of that broader litigation context by how it frames its
decision and in what it declines to decide. It leaves alone most pending
litigation except for the limited set of cases claiming federal common law
nuisance, and even then, it indicates that its ruling depends on the
current context of the EPA’s authority.32 The Court does not decide
whether state court nuisance cases are preempted and does not even
mention the many state court regulatory actions regarding coal-fired
power plants and other carbon-intensive projects (cases well beyond the
direct scope of AEP).33
The Court’s view of climate change litigation in AEP ensures that
courts will remain an important regulatory battleground in the United
States. The Court not only endorses the appropriateness of suits over the
EPA’s approach to regulating greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act,
but also allows this exploding area of litigation to continue—for the most
part—along its current trajectory. The increasing investment by law
firms, governmental entities, and nongovernmental organizations in
climate change litigation practice likely will proceed apace after AEP. In
my view, this aspect of the outcome is good news. As displayed in
Massachusetts, AEP, and the myriad of cases before lower courts,
litigation provides a way for key stakeholders to address conflicts over
how to move forward.34
For an in depth discussion of these dynamics, see Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change
Litigation as Pluralist Legal Dialogue?, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 181 & 43A STAN. J. INT’L L. 181
(2007); Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”?, supra note 6; Hari M. Osofsky, The
Continuing Importance of Climate Change Litigation, 1 CLIMATE L. 3 (2010); Hari M. Osofsky,
The Geography of Climate Change Litigation: Implications for Transnational Regulatory
Governance, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1789 (2005); Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Climate Change
Litigation Part II: Narratives of Massachusetts v. EPA, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 573 (2008). For an
interesting comparative analysis of U.S. and Australian approaches to climate change
litigation and of why national-level regulation is also critically important to effective
mitigation, see Jacqueline Peel, The Role of Climate Change Litigation in Australia’s Response to
Global Warming, 24 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J. 90 (2007). For an interesting socio-legal analysis of
the goals and regulatory role of climate change litigation, see Jolene Lin, Climate Change
and the Courts 4–5 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the author).
32
Am. Elec. Power Co., 131 S. Ct. at 2538–39.
33
Lin, supra note 31, at 6.
34
See supra note 31 and accompanying text. For an opposing view regarding the value
of climate change litigation in this symposium issue, see Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg,
31
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However, some of the unanswered questions and closed pathways
after AEP raise questions about the extent to which citizens will be able
to use litigation to challenge corporate decision-making and to achieve
redress for those harmed by climate change. Professor Burkett argues
that the Court’s decision to narrow possibilities for federal common law
nuisance actions raises serious justice concerns because it eliminates an
option for those injured by climate change to obtain corrective justice
from major emitters.35 While regulatory suits, if they result in greater
restrictions on greenhouse gas emissions, help to constrain the impacts of
climate change, they provide limited opportunities for victims to obtain
redress.
Notwithstanding the many procedural and substantive
concerns about climate change nuisance suits highlighted by Professor
Gerrard (issues that have not yet been addressed for the most part
because of the barriers that these cases have faced at early stages),36 these
suits do focus on the connection between emitters and victims in a way
that regulatory suits generally do not.
The decision by the Court to constrain this avenue for potential
justice has implications for the federal regulatory approach. Namely,
unless the Court’s decision in AEP is accompanied by greater assistance
for climate change victims in the regulatory framework, its emphasis on
the agency pathway risks exacerbating the climate justice problem by
providing fewer ways for victims to obtain redress. But addressing
climate justice within a federal regulatory framework, even assuming
there is adequate political support for such an approach, raises a host of
complex concerns. To the extent that climate justice involves helping
people with few resources adapt to climate change, the federal
adaptation program in collaboration with smaller scale adaptation efforts
provides relatively uncontroversial mechanisms for addressing
inequality.37
However, if a vision of climate justice also includes compensation for
harm that goes beyond adaptation assistance (e.g., the Inuit being unable

and Christopher E. Appel, Does the Judiciary Have the Tools for Regulating Greenhouse Gas
Emissions?, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 369, 400–01 (2012).
35
See Burkett, supra note 28.
36
See Michael B. Gerrard, What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, 121
YALE L.J. ONLINE 135 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/09/13/gerrard.html.
37
For the current U.S. federal approach to adaptation, see sources supra notes 11 & 13.
For U.S. state and local approaches, see Adaptation Planning—What U.S. States and Localities
are Doing, PEW CENTER ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/
docUploads/State_Adapation_Planning_04_23_08%20_2_.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
For an analysis of federalism dilemmas in U.S. adaptation planning, see Robert L.
Glicksman, Climate Change Adaptation: A Collective Action Perspective on Federalism
Considerations, 40 ENVTL. L. 1159, 1167–71 (2010).
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to use their ancestral lands in line with their traditional practices),38
integrating such compensation into a regulatory scheme, particularly if it
includes a corrective justice component of funding or other assistance
from major emitters,39 will likely be far more complex and politically
contentious. As litigation continues to shape the federal regulatory path,
important questions remain about how to help those most vulnerable to
climate change through domestic law. Major emitters’ choices are
intertwined with those of climate change victims, but these linkages are
hard to address directly through either mitigation or adaptation
programs. Whether courts or legislatures create a regulatory framework
for climate change, the United States needs to find better ways to address
these fundamental fairness concerns.

38
See supra note 16 and accompanying text. U.S. and Canadian Inuit filed a petition
with the Inter-American Commission, which was rejected, claiming that U.S. climate
change policy violated their rights. See Letter from the Org. of Am. States to Sheila WattCloutier, et al. regarding Petition No. P–1413–05, (Feb. 1, 2007) (on file with the author);
Letter from the Org. of Am. States to Sheila Watt-Cloutier, et al. regarding Petition No. P–
1413–05 (Nov. 16, 2006) (on file with the author); Letter from Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Martin
Wagner, and Daniel Magraw to Santiago Cantón, Exec. Sec’y, Inter-American Comm’n on
Human Rights (Jan. 15, 2007) (on file with the author); see also Hari M. Osofsky, The Inuit
Petition as a Bridge? Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, 31 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 675 (2007); Sheila Watt-Cloutier, Chair, Presentation at the Inuit
Circumpolar Conference Eleventh Conference of Parties to the UN Framework Convention
on Climate Change Montreal, (Dec. 7, 2005), www.inuitcircumpolar.com/index.php?ID=
318&Lang=En; Jane George, ICC Climate Change Petition Rejected, NUNATSIAQ NEWS (Dec.
15, 2006), http://www.nunatsiaqonline.ca/archives/61215/news/nunavut/61215_02.
html; Jonathan Spicer, Hearing to Probe Climate Change and Inuit Rights, REUTERS UK (Feb.
21, 2007, 10:14 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN204267120070221. In the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, a pending climate change federal common law nuisance case
involving indigenous peoples’ rights is on appeal after the district court dismissed the case
on justiciability grounds. Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863,
873–76 (N.D. Cal. 2009). This appeal will be impacted by the AEP decision.
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